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The current debate of risks of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) projects is 
rooted in the engineering world of Computer Science. Most academic and practical analyses 
follow a very rational and optimistic notion of ICT project risk - namely that risks can be 
identified, classified according to their probability and severity, and managed. This essay, 
however, will seek to develop the thinking away from this rational view by: firstly – 
discussing the ideas in academia that are progressing towards contingent models of risk 
perception; secondly -  arguing that risks of ICT projects can be conceptualised as pollution 
or a form of disturbance to a social order that is mirrored by plans and budgets; and thirdly -  
by showing that the states management of ICT project risks is a complex power that is 
exercised through institutions, procedures, and other ritualistic forms reflexivity.  
1. Risk = Probability * Severity  
Currently, the state of most political and academic debates about ICT project risks is 
comparable to the state of the debate about technological risks of the late 1960s. With the 
technological risks of nuclear power in mind, Starr (1969:1) argues that the decision about a 
technology should not only look at a performance-versus-cost but also the social-benefits-
versus-social-costs relationship.  
In the Computer Science literature the two most prominent conceptualisations of ICT project 
risks are captured by McFarlan and Boehm:  
"By risk I am suggesting exposure to such consequences as: Failure to obtain all, or 
even any, of the anticipated benefits; Costs of implementation that vastly exceed 
planned levels; Time for implementation that is much greater than expected; 
Technical performance of resulting systems that turns out to be significantly below 
estimate; Incompatibility of the system with the selected hardware and software."  
(McFarlan, 1981: 143). 
"Webster's dictionary defines risk as the possibility of loss or injury. This concept can 
be translated into Risk Exposure = Probability of an unsatisfactory outcome * Loss to 
the parties affected if an unsatisfactory outcome happens." (Boehm, 1991:427) 
Even more recent research studies into ICT project risks remain rather vague in their 
conceptualisation of  ‘ICT project risks’.  For instance, Sauer et al. (2007) use the notion of 
underperformance or unsatisfactory outcomes to define ICT project risk: "Projects are about 
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change and inevitably carry risk. It is not surprising to find a base level of risk, regardless of 
size. " (Sauer et al., 2007:83) 
A review of the traditional ICT risk management literature by Stahl et al. (2003) finds a 
strong focus on research to identify risks, to create checklists of risks, and to develop 
resolution techniques. The authors also underline the a-theoretical nature of most of the work 
but find that "recent work has gone beyond the traditional approach, but we demonstrate that 
the objectivist conception of risk is still implied. As a result, IS risk management relies on an 
untenable objectivist concept of risk. We argue that this assumption leads to the fallacious 
belief that risks can be comprehensively controlled by risk management." (Stahl et al. 2003: 
16).  
In a similar vein to Stahl et al.'s argument, Computer Science research finds that risk 
perceptions might differ between individuals. For instance Schmidt et al. (2001) find 
different perceptions of ICT project risks in different countries; Liu et al. (2010) show that 
the perception of ICT project risks differs between project managers and senior executives. 
This emerging body of academic thought parallels Slovic's (1987) research on technology 
risk perception. Slovic’s psychometric risk assessment originated in studies of probability 
and utility perception and subsequent decision-making (Slovic, 1987: 281). His research 
objectives were to quantify and predict the risk perception of different groups (Slovic, 1987: 
282), an objective that currently emerges in Computer Science with Liu et al. (2010) and 
Schmidt et al. (2001).  
On the practitioner’s side of the risk management of ICT projects, these emergent academic 
developments of risk perception research are pushing commonly accepted knowledge frames. 
Two of the most prominent project management methodologies,  OGC's (Office of 
Government Commerce) Prince 2 and PMI's Project Management Body of Knowledge 
(Fortune & White, 2002), frame risk as:  
"… a major factor to be considered during the management of any project. Project 
management must control and contain risks if a project is to stand a chance of being 
successful. Risk can be defined as uncertainty of outcome ... The task of risk 
management is to manage a project’s exposure to risk (that is, the probability of 
specific risks occurring and the potential impact if they did occur).The aim is to 
manage that exposure by taking action to keep exposure to an acceptable level in a 
cost-effective way" (OGC 2005, p. 77) 
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"Project Risk is always in the future. Risk is an uncertain event or condition, that if it 
occurs, has an effect on at least one project objective ... A cause may be a 
requirement, assumption, constraint, or condition that creates the possibility of 
negative or positive outcomes" (PMI 2008, p. 274). 
In 2000, the UK Cabinet Office published the McCartney report - a report which reviewed 
Government ICT projects and existing project management guidelines from the Treasury and 
the OGC. The report found that the current "guidelines emphasise the need for risk analysis 
to identify all risks, the likely impact on the project and the probability of the impact 
occurring” (McCartney, 2000:27).  The McCartney report championed the use of Summary 
Risk Profiles (cf. Figure 1) to manage ICT project risks (Cabinet Office, 2000:29). A tool to 
compare “the combination of impact and probability … against the project’s tolerance for 
cost, time and functionality. For all risks that fall outside the project’s tolerance, either 
mitigating or contingency actions … must be identified" (McCartney, 2000:27).   
Figure 1 - Summary Risk Profile (Cabinet Office, 2000: 29) 
 
These three management tools and methodologies view ICT project risks as a tame puzzle 
that can be identified, measured, and managed. Currently there is no practitioner’s reflection 
on contingent approaches of risks or even psychometric perceptions of risks. The 
methodologies represent an optimistic and positivistic  philosophy of risks and are very much 
comparable to Starr's discussion of technology risks (1969). 
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2. Cultural Theory of Risk 
Cultural Theory provides a "forensic approach that uses dangers, taboos, and risks to reveal 
the internal structure and systems of accountability and responsibilities of cultures" (Tansey 
& Rayner, 2009:57).  Although positivistic and optimistic state-of-the-art discourse in 
practice and academia might improve the actual performance of ICT projects, a discussion of 
Cultural Theory contributes to the debate by strengthen and widen the theoretical foundation 
of the discourse. As Cultural Theorists have argued, the first step is to broaden the focus of 
attention from individuals to social organizations. By doing so, the discussions around ICT 
projects can  overcome Durkheim's deterministic notion that social institutions map patterns 
of individual cognition (Tansey & Rayner 2009, Douglas 1999). Cultural Theory allows for 
the fusion of the cultural processes of categorisation and contention with functional 
implications for agency and power, particular in cases where collective action emerges as a 
reaction to risks (Tansey & Rayner 2009:55). Cultural Theory brings in a dynamic view of 
power, focusing on its ability to distribute, organise, negotiate and exchange accountability 
and responsibility for risks (ibid, p. 56).  
Non-technical pollution is a "contagious state, harmful, caused by outside intervention, but 
mysterious in its origins" (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982:36). In more general terms pollution 
is the morally wrong disturbance of a carefully socially constructed order. Mysterious 
pollution beliefs are of special interest to Cultural Theory because, as Douglas & Wildavsky 
(1982) further argue: "Pollution beliefs trace causal chains from actions to disasters" (p. 36). 
They categorise concepts of a social organisation, whilst separating conceptual from physical 
categories. They are instrumental in defining the vision of a good society, dividing the moral 
from the immoral, the guilty from the innocent, and the absolution process from the blaming 
process (ibid., pp. 37-38). As Douglas & Wildavsky state, "pollution ideas are an instrument 
of control" (1982, p. 47).   
To illustrate the power of Cultural Theory, a rough sketch of how ICT project risks were 
managed in NPfIT will be drawn by applying Douglas & Wildavsky's routine set of questions 
(1982:37):  
• What is disturbed?  
• Who disturbs the order?  
• Who is to blame?  
• And how is order re-established? 
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2.1. The Case – The National Programme for IT in the NHS (NPfIT) 
In June 2002, the Department of Health launched the NPfIT. Two month later the Ministers 
appointed the first Director General for NHS IT. In April 2005 NHS IT was integrated into a 
new government agency called NHS Connecting for Health (NAO, 2006). To put it into 
context, the National Audit Office (2006) described the NPfIT’s ' scope, vision and 
complexity (as) wider and more extensive than any ongoing or planned healthcare IT 
programme in the world... it represents the largest single IT investment in the UK to date' 
(NAO, 2006:1). 
Unfortunately, or quite predictably, the NPfIT overran its budget and fell behind schedule. 
When the programme started in 2002 contracts of a total value of GBP 6.2 billion were 
awarded for a ten year lifespan up until 2013-14. By 2006 the cost increased to GBP 12.4 
billion (in 2004-05 prices) and the programme progressed slower than expected: it only spent 
654m of the expected 1,448m by March 2006. Furthermore, the responsible minister 
announced on May 30th, 2006 that the full costs of NPfIT was most likely to be GBP 20 
billion (NAO 2006:4-5). 
To illustrate the NPfIT case, five vocal actors will be used. These actors have concerned 
themselves with issue and have published press releases, analyses, and official reports:  
1) The National Audit Office, who audited the NPfIT (report published in June 2006) 
2) The British Computer Society, recognised experts in the field who published open 
letters 
3) ComputerWeekly, the UK's leading IT newspaper in which journalist Tony Collins 
investigates public ICT projects 
4) The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in the House of Commons, a Conservatives 
dominated body, which conducted a public inquiry into the NPfIT (published in 
March 2007) 
5) The Health Committee in the House of Commons, a Labour dominated body, whose 
own inquiry was published in July 2007. 
2.2. What is disturbed? 
The NPfIT overran its budget and schedule. Why does this matter? Budgets and schedules are 
instruments of command and control: "Budgets are well known for reinforcing the  command 
and control culture, constraining freedom and autonomy" (Hope & Fraser, 1999:17). The 
authors cite Chrysler's head of global product development who called budgets ‘tools of 
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repression’ (ibid.). Budgeting typically follows a cybernetic philosophy of "setting goals, 
measuring achievement, comparing achievement to goals, feeding back information about 
unwanted variances into the process to be controlled, and correcting the process" (Hofstede, 
1978: 451). Thus budgeting and scheduling are technologies to manage performance 
uncertainties in organisations and to establish accountability for performance. 
Historically, a major break-through in budgeting was the line-item budget, where line-items 
organised organisational needs into measurable categories (Wildavsky, 1986). Wildavsky 
argues further that: "The more line-items there are and the finer the differentiation among 
them, the better they mirror the division of labour within the bureaucracy and,  by extension, 
the roles and statuses the regime is trying to maintain"  (1986:337). The 1960/70s shift 
towards programme budgeting in the public sector signified a cultural change from 
hierarchies towards markets. This shift illustrated a shifting focus from valuing and providing 
specific resources towards aiming for the most efficient provision of interchangeable resource 
(ibid, p. 338).  
The usual procedural reaction to failing ICT projects in the UK is to commission a review by 
the National Audit Office (NAO), as occurred, for instance, with the Courts' Libra System or 
the Department of Work's Pension Scheme. NAO first tried to allocate the cost overrun to 
specific budget categories. It analysed the cost overrun and found five points of disturbance  
• GBP 382m was to be spent on additional projects 
• GBP 239m was for additional services 
• GBP 1.9b was for other central expenditure 
• GBP 337m was to replace the expiring contracts 
• GBP 3.4b was for local NHS expenditures, e.g., training and compliance 
The NAO concludes in their initial analysis that: "[The department and NHS Connecting for 
Health] successfully placed contracts very quickly, after securing large reductions in prices 
from bidders, and including contract terms that include important safeguards to secure value 
for money for the taxpayer." (NAO, 2006: 6). The report also stated that the central budget 
had been managed sufficiently (ibid, p. 24). This finding is noteworthy because it reflects one 
of the major trenches of the NPfIT: the distinction between central (Department of Health) 
and local (NHS trusts) organisations. The NAO reported that cost overruns mostly happened 
on the local level because local costs were not included in initial budget calculations (ibid, p. 
24). However, almost the same amount of budget increases (GBP 2.9b) happened at the 
central level, which the report did not point out.  
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Apart from the cost overrun, the NAO report also located the schedule disturbance by 
investigating the NPfIT programme project by project (ibid, pp. 14-23). Again this approach 
mirrored the central-local split in management and control of the organisation as national and 
local products were organised along those lines. 
2.3. Who disturbed the order? 
The NAO, Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Health Committee made similar 
statements, identifying the hospital PAS, the electronic prescribing system and the detailed 
care records as the upsetting elements of the NPfIT (House of Commons Health Committee, 
2007: 55-56; House of Commons PAC, 2007: 12-15; NAO, 2006:24).  However, the Health 
and the PACs were not blaming any specific organisation for disturbing the order.  
The journalist, Tony Collin, pointed out that the major causes for the NPfIT delays and cost 
overruns lay with the two software providers iSoft and Cerner. The disturbance went as far as 
lying to the Prime Minister. The software providers stated in the PM's briefing from February 
2007 that "…much of the programme is complete with software delivered on time and to 
budget", when in fact (as the PAC later pointed out) the software was delayed by two years. 
(Collins, 2008b).   
As argued before, the NAO and the PAC linked the upset of budget and schedule order to 
neglecting the costs for local NHS organisations. (House of Commons PAC, 2007:20-21; 
NAO, 2006:26). 
2.4. Who is to blame? 
To start,, for the central components of the NPfIT, the NAO report blamed the 
"heterogeneous nature of the NHS" for the delays of NPfIT (NAO, 2006:24). However the 
report was not blaming any other part involved in the programme. It explicitly stated that 
they were "satisfied with the central expenditure being managed within budget" (ibid, p. 24) 
and that "the Programme has strong ministerial and senior management support" (NAO, 
2006:2). It further added that "the Department and NHS Connecting for Health have put in 
place best practice arrangements that will support the elements of the Programme and the 
Department has established best practice structures to deliver the Programme" (NAO, 
2006:2). The NAO report highlighted that the Department of Health had created a rigorous 
competition for the contracts awarded, that the financial risks were mitigated to the suppliers 
by using payment schedules, guarantees, bonuses and penalties, and open book accounting.  
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For two of the NPfIT projects, the NAO report blamed the schedule overrun on the non-
performance of two individual software vendors (ibid, p. 24), specifically linking the 
overruns to non-performance caused by a) not being co-located; and b) a lack of proper 
incentives to encourage delivery (ibid, p. 38). In the case of a third troubled project in the 
NPfIT, NAO blamed BT's lack of communication with the local NHS organisations 
regarding the roll-out plans.  
Secondly, the local cost overrun of the NPfIT was blamed on a planning technicality. The 
initial estimates did not include local NHS costs, whereas the most recent cost estimates 
included local costs because of a Ministerial decision to provide the software free of charge 
to local NHS trusts (ibid, p. 24).  
Thirdly, the NAO circumvented the benefits/risks discussion by stating that the impact had 
not been monitored systematically but rather, that the auditors believed in "local savings of a 
substantial scale" (ibid, p. 27). The report also blamed the local NHS for not providing the 
needed local staff to support the project (ibid, p. 49). 
As a follow-up to the NAO report, the Health Committee's investigation more specifically 
uncovered where the blame was pointed. The hearing found that officials from the 
Department and the NPfIT blamed the delays, as recorded in the Detailed Care Record 
(DCR), on a significant enlargement of the scope. Furthermore,, according to the Director 
General of NPfIT, the fixed budget did not allow problems to be resolved because it 
prevented the hiring of temporary staff, which further delayed the  delivery. BT argued that a 
slow start was normal in ICT projects and delivery speed would pick up, while CSC blamed 
the sheer scale and complexity of the NHS. Outside experts blamed the NPfIT for having 
unrealistic and overambitious schedule goals, a lack of clear specifications, the failure to 
appreciate the need for changes to processes and working practices. Academic experts also 
blamed the NHS for taking an excessively centralised approach and for a  lack of clinical and 
user engagements (House of Commons Health Committee, 2007:59-60). 
The delay in the Patient Administration System (PAS) implementation was blamed on the 
software providers because of the need to convert a US system to NHS needs in one case, and, 
in another case, because of the  replacement of a software provider.  These factors created 
uncertainties for other providers. Again the complexity of the system was blamed for the 
delay as well as unexpected difficulties in data migration (House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2007:62).  
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The Health Committee's report faced voices of opposition: three conservative MPs refused to 
sign the report because it followed the line of the government and gave up on the idea to 
conduct an independent audit of the programme (Collins, 2007). Thus, the less Labour-
dominated PAC, started a separate inquiry into the NPfIT. Their report blamed cost overruns 
on the failure of NPfIT to monitor and plan the costs of local NHS organisations, which had 
to be substantially lifted and even shifted into the central budget to achieve buy-in from the 
trusts (House of Commons PAC, 2007: 21).  
Regarding the schedule delays, the PAC blamed mainly the Department of Health for: 
creating a plan that the providers were incapable of delivering; not communicating with the 
local NHS organisations and clinical staff;  being deficient in maintaining a detailed record of 
expenditures; and focussing on delivering IT systems at the expense of paying proper 
attention to changes needed in business. The PAC also attributed the delays to NPfIT’s 
dependence on two sole software suppliers who failed to deliver (House of Commons PAC, 
2007: 5).  
The PAC report reiterated the argument that, because of the centralistic nature of the project, 
early decisions were made without a full degree of consultation (House of Commons PAC, 
2007: 17). With a more aggressive rhetoric tone, MP Bacon stated that: "The crisis is a direct 
result of the original foolish decision made on a No 10 sofa - to allow the programme to be 
held hostage by a tiny group of Local Service Providers and their preferred software 
suppliers." (Bacon, 2008).  
Media investigations, after the publication of the NAO, Health, and PAC reports, pointed out 
that the NPfIT blamed attitudes and behaviours for the delay. ComputerWeekly discovered 
the NPfIT's briefing to the Prime Minister in which the NPfIT said: "…the key challenges 
and risks of delivery are now not about the technology to support NPfIT but about attitudes 
and behaviours which need to be the focus of senior management and ministerial attention as 
we move forward…" (Collins, 2008b). Collins went as far as to blame the labour party for 
this outcome (Collins, 2007) and later (Collins, 2008a) he published an article proving that in 
a meeting on 18 February 2002, Tony Blair alone shifted the timeline of NPfIT forward so 
that the system would be ready by the general election 2005. Collins argues that this shift is 
what gave rise to the "hopelessly optimistic" time scale. However, Collins also cited experts 
who argued that it was not only Tony Blair who should be to blame, but also the Department 
of Health, which gave misleading briefings stating that the only constraints were: (1) funding; 
and (2) the need for more central control over IT spending (Collins, 2008a).  
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The Media also saw the DailyMail pointing the blame finger at "Tony Blair and his 
apparatchiks" for having created a programme that only provided consultants with lucrative 
contracts, and which led to the project manager,  a former consultant who failed his computer 
studies course at university, to become the highest paid civil servant in the country (Brennan, 
2010).   
In short everybody blamed everybody - the NPfIT blamed suppliers, the vendors blamed the 
NHS and bad luck, the Health Committee blamed the vendors, the Public Accounts Spending 
Committee blamed the Department of Health, and the press blamed the government. 
2.5. How to re-establish the order? 
The NAO report detailed that the Department of Health and its suppliers had tried to re-
establish the order by excluding the blamed, non-performing organisation. The report 
described that, in the beginning, BT and Fujitsu awarded their software contracts to a 
software provider called IDX. Two years later, the NPfIT became worried about the 
performance of IDX and audited the software vendor's capacity and capabilities. Then the 
NPfIT put increasing pressure on IDX to encourage them to deliver the Common Solution 
until finally Fujitsu requested permission from the NPfIT to exclude IDX and to start finding 
a new supplier (NAO, 2006:37).  
In another project within the NPfIT, the order was re-established by re-organising BT's 
project organisation into separate development, support, and service roles and by establishing 
a user acceptance testing process. The new organisational structure was labelled as a ‘best 
practice’ by  the NAO (ibid, p. 39).  
The NAO (2006:2) concluded in their report that further corrective action was necessary. In 
particular they recommended that: 
• The NPfIT should provide greater clarity to impacted organisations as to when 
different elements would be delivered, continue to manage suppliers' performance 
tightly, and report the achieved benefits annually; 
• NHS organisations should communicate how this was going to affect them; 
• NPfIT should study how local costs are impacted and how previous local NHS IT 
projects have changed the way the NHS works; 
• NHS, DoH, and NPfIT should build project management capabilities. 
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The Health Care Committee's report cites experts that recommended two approaches to re-
establishing the order: (1) An independent technical review; and (2) An effort to increase 
local ownership (House of Commons Health Committee, 2007:66). However the commission 
of an independent review was fought down by the Department (ibid, p. 67). This behaviour 
reinforced the accusations that the NPfIT and the Department of Health were overly secretive 
– an accusation which was first raised by Conservatives in 2004 and also by the British 
Computer Society (Bacon, 2004, The British Computer Society, 2005, Collins 2007). Experts 
and politicians criticised that, although the NPfIT was regularly audited in Stage Gate 
Reviews and although the NPfIT commissioned external consultants to review the 
programme, the Department of Health never published those findings (Collins, 2007). 
Furthermore, politicians and experts forced the NPfIT to shift more power to the local level 
in order to re-establish order, i.e. the structure and control of budgets and schedules. NPfIT 
had to allow GPs to select from a wider range of software solutions and NPfIT moved 
procurement to the local level, restricting its role to setting central standards (House of 
Commons PAC, 2007:68). The Health Committee concluded that the power shift was long 
overdue but needed to go further by shifting the overall responsibility for the NPfIT to the 
Strategic Health Authorities and their Primary Care Trusts, whilst empowering the local 
organisations  to negotiate with Service Providers to create more local solutions (House of 
Commons PAC, 2007: 80). 
Apart from action by NPfIT the PAC demanded that the Department of Health re-establish 
order by 
• Developing a schedule that suppliers were capable of delivering against  
• Improving the record of expenditure and publishing an annual statement 
• Conducting an independent assessment of benefits and costs 
• Reviewing the suppliers capacity to deliver in terms of staff and economic situation 
• Improving communication to clinicians and considering the broader change needed 
• Clarifying responsibility and accountability on the local level 
• Prioritising the roll-out of functionality according to clinical benefits  
(House of Commons PAC, 2007:5-7) 
2.6. Finally, a clumsy solution to manage a wicked problem 
To put the NPfIT case in a nutshell – the NPfIT overran its budget and schedule. Thus, the 
ICT project caused upsets by introducing uncertainty into a carefully planned mission, and it 
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disturbed the central control, normally exercised by the state, over the public sector. The 
Department of Health and the NPfIT had relied on central planning and bundling of market 
forces, and had transferred most of the financial risk to the supplier side. However, when the 
delays and cost escalation occurred it became clear that the buying side still faced significant 
risks in scheduling and realizing benefits.  
As a reaction, the NPfIT, NAO, the Health Committee and the PAC all conducted reviews of 
the NPfIT. These reviews applied two lenses to find the culprit: they reviewed the NPfIT’s 
budget, item by item, with the results reinforcing the trench of local vs. central budget; and 
they reviewed the NPfIT’s schedule, project by project, with the results leading to dispersed 
accusations and criticisms. The accusations saw the NPfIT blaming supplier performance for 
the risk and complexity for the disturbance, the vendors (not biting the hand that feeds them) 
blaming the NHS and bad luck, the Health Committee blaming the vendors, the Public 
Accounts Spending Committee blaming the Department of Health, and the press blaming 
Tony Blair personally for the disturbance. 
To re-establish the order, the NPfIT identified, audited, pressured and then excluded the non-
performing supplier from the project. Even though the Department of Health fought down the 
commission of an independent review, NPfIT was nevertheless forced to shift power towards 
stronger participation of clinical staff through better communication and by offering a choice 
of different systems to local NHS. Thus the disturbance pushed the initial solution of risk 
management, which relied on competition between suppliers and top-down planning, towards 
stronger inclusion.   
As the NPfIT case shows, the risks of ICT projects should not only be managed according to 
a positivistic, optimistic, engineering view, but would benefit from applying a sociological 
perspective. The grid-group typology necessitates that risk management needs to be a clumsy 
solution, a working compromise between different actors. NPfIT programme took a strong 
hierarchical position with regards to their risk management, the Department of Health and 
Health Committee took a strong competitive position, and  the PAC, the press and the British 
Computer Society adopted an egalitarian position. The initial solution incorporated 
hierarchical and market approaches but neglected participative elements. When two non-
performing suppliers upset the budgetary and schedule order, egalitarian groups used official 
inquiries to push the NPfIT risk management solution further towards egalitarianism and 
markets by shifting power to the local NHS organisations (cf. fig. 2).  
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Figure 2 - Cultural Theory Development of the NPfIT Risk Management 
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3. Governmentality 
Governmentality, according to Foucault (2009:102-103), has three aspects:  
(1) A complex form of power that targets the population, which is based on political 
economy as the principal form of knowledge and which is exercised by institutions, 
procedures, analysis, reflections, calculations and tactics;  
(2) The historic rise of the government apparatuses as dominant design of the governance of 
a population; and  
(3) The governmentalisation of the states of justice of the Middle Ages (Foucault, 2009: 
102-103). 
Central to his thoughts on governmentality are Foucault's Nietzscheian arguments that power 
technologies are first applied to the fringes of society and later permeate society completely, 
and that the separation of body and mind leads to states controlling bodies, not minds, by 
creating apparatuses of discipline and power (Foucault, 1995). 
Castel provides a reflexive historic analysis of the mental health profession. He traces how 
the notion of being a danger to self and others transformed into being in a risk group, which 
subsequently gave rise to risk factor analysis; which shifted treatment strategies from 
'separate and confine individuals' to 'control and eradicate at risk groups' and lately to 
'interventions as social action' (Castel, 2009). Because of the latter Castel argues that, 
contrary to Foucault, governmentality is "more coercive and reparative than preventive in 
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function" (2009:295) and that society has replaced the notion of discipline by the notion of 
efficiency where the state aims to project an order instead of imposing it (ibid.). 
Surprisingly, the same development can be traced through the academic, practical and 
political discourse of risks of ICT projects. The academic discourse about the risk of ICT 
projects started in the late 1980s when several researchers applied the concept of success 
factor research from management studies to ICT projects (e.g., Baker & Fisher, 1988; Pinto 
& Slevin, 1987). As Pinto & Covin (1989) outline, the notion of critical success factors imply 
that certain causal patterns are essential to success in multiple types of projects - a notion 
which replaced the conviction that each particular projects pose entirely unique kinds of 
problems. 
This line of thinking is also reflected in the UK Cabinet Office's McCartney Report (2000), 
which identified success factors for public project delivery, e.g. integrated change 
management, and improving responsibility, measurement and realisation of benefits. In line 
with Foucault argument, the state created an apparatuses of power as an outcome: the 
McCartney report specifically recommended the set-up of  
• Institutions – Central IT Unit, Centre for Management and Policy Studies (CMPS), 
Senior Responsible Owner (SRO)  
• Procedures – SRO must ensure the use of standard methodologies, commission 
periodic peer reviews, standardise procurement and gateway approval processes 
• Analysis – Business Cases, Project Profile Model 
• Reflections – CMPS shall identify the 'Skills For the Information Age', train ministers 
and staff; the projects need to reflect upon their communication with suppliers, and 
appraise their own  project management capabilities 
• Calculations – Summary Risk Profile, Evaluation of plans and bids 
• Tactics – Checklists for roles and responsibilities, Modular delivery approaches 
A similar development was triggered in the US with the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (U.S. 
House, 1996), which reformed the federal spending on ICT projects in two important ways. 
Firstly, section §11317 made the head of each executive agency directly accountable for any 
major deviation from the cost, performance or schedule goals of the ICT project. In the UK, 
several politicians have argued for adopting a similar measure to hold ministers responsible 
for their ICT project risks.  Secondly, section §11302 directed agencies to collect data and 
statistically analyse their project risks:  "… the Director shall develop a process for analyzing, 
tracking, and evaluating the risks and results of all major capital investments made by an 
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executive agency for information systems." This development mirrors what Foucault 
identified as a historic shift from sovereignty to the society of government (2009:92) -  a shift 
that was made possible by the birth of population statistics by Gaunt and Petty in the 1660s 
(Wilcox, 1938).  
Similar to Castel's findings (2009), in 2008 the treatment strategy of ICT project risks moved 
from managing risk factors to managing at risk projects; whereby it was no longer necessary 
that the project showed the symptoms of the illness, it became sufficient to be exposed to a 
set of five risk factors. "High Risk Projects require special attention from oversight 
authorities and the highest levels of agency management because: 1) the agency has not 
consistently demonstrated the ability to manage complex projects; 2) of the exceptionally 
high development, operating, or maintenance costs … 3) it is being undertaken … [as] an 
essential mission program or function of the agency … or 4) delay or failure would introduce 
for the first time inadequate performance or failure of an essential mission program or 
function of the agency… " (Executive Office of the President Office of Management and 
Budget, 2008:6).  Currently investments are identified to be a high risk by evaluating five 
factors: risk management, requirements management, contractor oversight, historical 
performance, and human capital. These high risk factors form the OMB watch list (Executive 
Office of the President Office of Management and Budget, 2010).  
To complete the circle, government institutions like the OGC have created project 
management methodology courses that are certified as a professional qualification, thus 
reinforcing the beliefs of how to manage ICT projects, how to identify at risk projects, and 
how to turn-around projects that have upset the order (OGC, 2009). Moreover, professionals 
taking these qualifications need to commit to a code of conduct. APM’s example of such a 
commitment states: "Members are expected to exercise relevant competence in accordance 
with the association’s professional standards and qualifications, as underpinned by the APM 
Body of Knowledge" (Association for Project Management).  
These governmental and non-governmental institutions have converted the findings of the 
1990s success factor research programme in project management into management 
methodologies, resulting in the creation of an education industry to accredit suppliers. 
Selection of  their suppliers is based on those credentials. Thus, the state created apparatuses 
through agencies like the OGC and independent professional organisations such as APM, to 
fully internalise best practice conduct and punishing deviation from it.  
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Cultural Theory can advance our understanding of ICT project risks  
This essay has shown that the majority of the practical and academic discourse of ICT project 
risks follows an engineering philosophy:  risks can be identified, classified according to their 
probability and severity  and managed. It has also shown how academia developed the first 
advances into contingent models of risk perception. 
The NPfIT case was used to illustrate, how ICT project risks can be conceptualised as a form 
of disturbance to a social order comprised of schedules and budgets. Using the Cultural 
Theory grid-group model, it was further explained how egalitarian groups in society used an 
upset in the order of the NPfIT to grab power and to shift the ICT management of project risk  
to a clumsy solution.  
Lastly, three critical transition points, in line with Foucault’s concept of Governmentality 
were demonstrated: how  research on risk factors of ICT projects has been converted into 
project management methodologies to tame ICT project risks; how legislation has introduced 
statistical management and identification and separation of at-risk- projects from the 
portfolio; and  how apparatuses of power use professional education and accreditation to 
uphold those structures. 
Space and time constraints have restricted this essay to a superficial theoretical discussion 
with only a very rough phenomenological analysis of only a single case that hardly 
penetrated the surface of the issue at hand.  Also, the theoretical discussion had to be very 
limited and could not react to the criticism that the cited theories faced, e.g., for either their 
ontological perspective in Starr's case, Cultural Theory being functionalistic, or 
Governmentality for being historically simplistic and structurally over-deterministic.  
Nevertheless, the essay showed that the academic discourse of ICT project risks would 
greatly benefit from broadening the currently dominant engineering and psychometric lenses 
to sociological analysis. Similarly practitioners and policy makers should realise that ICT 
project risks are socially and culturally embedded, which hides the risks from view, biases 
risk selection and assessment, causes ambiguity and contradictions in risk reviews, and 
makes politicises the discourse of how to deal with and communicate ICT project risk.   
Succinctly, if academia and practice fathom that ICT project risks are a Collective Construct 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1986), it would improve the overall understanding of ICT project 
risks.    
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